In this Volume II of the Warbirds and Words Journal we examine the operational origins of one of the most famous aircraft from the Second World War - the BOEING B-17 'FLYING FORTRESS'.
The Summer of 1934 saw the USAAC seeking a new bomber, although they did not specify the size of the payload it should carry; only the aircraft's performance specifications - flight at 200 mph for ten hours at 10,000 ft. At that time across the Atlantic, the approach by Britain, France and Germany had been one of the fast bomber - twin-engined machines that prioritised speed over payload, ensuring that they could evade defending fighters on the way to and from the target. But Boeing now took a different approach, designing a four-engined machine that bristled with defensive firepower.
On the 27th July 1935, the day before the test flight of the 'Model 299', a reporter with The Seattle Times - Richard Williams - captioned an image of the aircraft with the words '15 ton Flying Fortress'. Boeing were delighted with this moniker, and moved immediately to make it official. Soon afterwards, the 'Flying Fortress' looked to have the competition all stitched up, dominating her twin-engined competitors at the 'fly-off' held by the USAAC; so much so that a purchase of 65 B-17s was suggested even before the competition came to its formal conclusion.
But fate had a tragic hand to play in the story. On 30th October 1935, during a test flight of the Model 299 under the command of Major Ployer Peter Hill, piloting his first test flight in the aircraft under the supervision of Boeing's Chief Test Pilot, Leslie Tower, the aircraft stalled and spun in almost immediately after take-off. In the days before checklists were commonplace, it was later determined that a gust lock had not been removed before flight. Hill and Tower lost their lives, although others aboard survived. The Model 299 was seriously damaged and automatically disqualified from the competition, despite the USAAC remaining ebullient about its potential.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​
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As is so commonplace in today's military procurement, unit cost now played a deciding factor - Douglas offered their twin-engined B-18 Bolo at almost half the price quoted for the 299, and the order for 65 units of the latter was cancelled. Secretary of War Woodring went even further in 1938, decreeing that no four-engined bombers would be procured by the USAAC.
The Model 299 after the accident on 30th October 1935
But just as inevitable as the influence of the budget managers - fortunately - was the influence of those with the foresight to see the utility of a four-engined bomber in the global crisis to come. Through a funding loophole around development vice production, thirteen YB-17s were ordered for testing by the Service, and during 1937 these were delivered to the 2nd Bombardment Group in Virginia - among the upgrades over the original Model 299 were Wright Cyclone engines.
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On the 29th April 1938, a Y1B-17 (as the type was now designated) took to the skies equipped with General Electric turbochargers. This aircraft - Y1B-17A 37-369 - could reach 311 mph at its most efficient operating altitude, and a service ceiling of 38,000 ft; a tremendous improvement over the 27,800 ft of the Y1B-17. The B-17 as it would now finally become had proven its worth, and the turbocharged B-17B began to be delivered to the USAAC between July 1939 and March 1940, just as the spark of World War was ignited in Europe. July 1940 saw the placing of the first major order - 512 examples of what would be the B-17E.
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In Britain, the B-17 had caught the attention of those seeking desperately to bolster Bomber Command's capabilities. The current crop of twin-engined designs - Whitley, Wellington, Blenheim, Hampden - were showing their age, and the RAF needed something urgently that could put Britain on the aerial offensive while the Short Stirling and other indigenous heavies completed their development. The answer was an arrangement to suit both parties - the acquisition by the RAF of 20 B-17Cs, in return for which the USAAC would be provided all information about the type's combat performance. And so the 'Fortress Mk I' joined the ranks of the Royal Air Force - the first service to operate the B-17 in action.
B-17C 'Fortress Mk I' with No 90 Squadron RAF
On 8th July 1941, the B-17Cs of the RAF's number 90 Squadron were despatched to Wilhelmshaven for a raid, very similar to those that had proven so costly to date for the UK. The operation was unsuccessful, and later that month 90 Squadron returned once again, but this time as high altitude 'bait' to draw the Luftwaffe away from the twin-engined types attacking at lower altitude. The bait was not taken.
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By September, after just two months of operations, the RAF had lost eight of their B-17C complement and seen many grounded due to technical problems (25 of 51 sorties had been abandoned due to mechanical failures). The data was provided to the USAAF (as it had by then become) as promised, but the two air services reached very different conclusions - for the British it was final confirmation that daylight bombing was ineffective, and that the B-17 was not ready for combat. While agreeing with the last point, the bomber proponents in the USA were unflinching in their resolve that daylight bombing was the answer - the B-17 simply needed to be improved, and better tactics employed.
No 90 Squadron Fortress I aircrew at RAF Polebrook donning electrically heated flight suits
(IWM photograph)
On 8th July 1941, the B-17Cs of the RAF's number 90 Squadron were despatched to Wilhelmshaven for a raid, very similar to those that had proven so costly to date for the UK. The operation was unsuccessful, and later that month 90 Squadron returned once again, but this time as high altitude 'bait' to draw the Luftwaffe away from the twin-engined types attacking at lower altitude. The bait was not taken.
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By September, after just two months of operations, the RAF had lost eight of their B-17C complement and seen many grounded due to technical problems (25 of 51 sorties had been abandoned due to mechanical failures). The data was provided to the USAAF (as it had by then become) as promised, but the two air services reached very different conclusions - for the British it was final confirmation that daylight bombing was ineffective, and that the B-17 was not ready for combat. While agreeing with the last point, the bomber proponents in the USA were unflinching in their resolve that daylight bombing was the answer - the B-17 simply needed to be improved, and better tactics employed. For their part, the RAF transferred their Fortress Is to Coastal Command to become maritime patrol aircraft.
The B-17G would be the definitive version of Boeing's Flying Fortress
It would be almost a year later, in August 1942, that the B-17 made its combat debut in Europe with the USAAF, when twelve B-17Es struck a marshalling yard in France. The exploits of the 8th Air Force in the Combined Bomber Offensive is a story we will return to many times in future volumes, but in hindsight it is remarkable that an aircraft which was nearly eliminated in its development, and then foregone as a strategic bomber by the first service to operate it, should eventually become the backbone of the daylight air offensive against the Third Reich.